Labor Mobility and Racial Discrimination by Deschamps, Pierre & De Sousa, Jose
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Labor Mobility and Racial
Discrimination
Pierre Deschamps and Jose De Sousa
Sciences Po, Paris, De´partement d’Economie, LIEPP, Department of
Economics, University of Paris Sud
2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60572/
MPRA Paper No. 60572, posted 13 December 2014 08:14 UTC
Labor Mobility and Racial Discrimination∗
Pierre Deschamps† José de Sousa‡
December 12, 2014
Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of labor mobility on racial discrim-
ination. We present an equilibrium search model that reveals an in-
verted U-shaped relationship between labor mobility and race-based
wage differentials. We explore this relationship empirically with an
exogenous mobility shock on the European soccer labor market. The
Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 lifted restric-
tions on soccer player mobility. Using a panel of all clubs in the English
first division from 1981 to 2008, we compare the pre- and post-Bosman
ruling market to identify the causal effect of intensified mobility on
race-based wage differentials. Consistent with a taste-based explana-
tion, we find evidence that increasing labor market mobility decreases
racial discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J6, J71)
∗We thank Stijn Baert, Eve Caroli, Isabelle Chort, Frédéric Docquier, Cécilia Garcia-
Penalosa, Daniel Hamermesh, Alexandre Janiak, Miren Lafourcade, François Langot,
Rigas Oikonomou, Emmanuel Saez, Etienne Wasmer, Yves Zenou and seminar and con-
ference participants at the U. Louvain-la-Neuve, U. of Le Mans, U. Paris-Dauphine, U. of
Paris-Evry, U. of Paris-Sud, U. of Porto, U. of Washington, and U. of Zurich for helpful
discussions and comments. We are very grateful to Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais and
Emmanuel Saez for sharing their data with us. We thank also Evgenii Monastyrenko,
Cecilia Rivera and Abdoul Sall for excellent research assistance. This work is supported
by a public grant overseen by the French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the
“Investissements d’Avenir program (reference: ANR-11-LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-
02)”.
†Pierre Deschamps: Sciences Po, Paris, Département d’Economie,
pierre.deschamps@sciencespo.fr.
‡José de Sousa: Université Paris Sud, RITM and Sciences Po, Paris, LIEPP, Jose.de-
Sousa@u-psud.fr.
1
1 Introduction
Race differentials in labor market outcomes continue to persist and evidence
suggests that these differences are partly the consequence of racial discrim-
ination.1 “Why do people discriminate against one another, and how can
we get them to stop?” (Gneezy and List, 2013, 5). Job-to-job mobility is a
promising route to answer these questions. Constraints on mobility, such as
quotas, work permits, or restrictive contracting rules on national labor, may
limit the ability of workers to move from prejudiced firms to unprejudiced
ones. When mobility is constrained, a firm is able to act on its prejudice
because of the low cost of doing so.
This paper assesses the role of job-to-job mobility on racial discrimination.
We present an equilibrium search model that reveals an inverted U-shaped
relationship between labor mobility and race-based wage differentials. We
explore this relationship empirically with an exogenous mobility shock on
the European soccer labor market. The Bosman ruling by the European
Court of Justice in 1995 lifted restrictions on soccer player mobility. Using
a panel of all clubs in the English first division from 1981 to 2008, we com-
pare the pre- and post-Bosman ruling market to identify the causal effect of
intensified mobility on racial discrimination. Consistent with a taste-based
explanation based on the work of Becker (1957), we find evidence that racial
discrimination disappears with high levels of labor market mobility.
The European soccer market offers four important advantages for the
study of mobility and discrimination. First, following the Bosman ruling,
we observe large variation in labor mobility, making this market a valuable
and visible laboratory to study the effect on discrimination. Specifically,
the pre-Bosman era had two important restrictions on job-to-job mobility:
(1) transfer fees needed to be paid for out-of-contract players and (2) the
number of foreigners was restricted by a quota system.2 The ruling, which
came into effect in December 1995, removed the quota barriers for European
1See Altonji and Blank (1999), Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Charles and Guryan
(2011) for reviews of the literature.
2In Europe, the number of foreigners allowed to play was governed by a “3+2” rule: 3
foreign European players and 2 non-European players.
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Union (EU) nationals and the obligation to pay a fee for out-of-contract
players.3 Figure (1) illustrates the intensified mobility of the soccer market
in the wake of the Bosman ruling.4 In 2008, the ratio of foreigners in first
league squads exceeded 50% in England and in other European countries
such as Germany, Greece and Switzerland. Players can now field offers from
potentially any country in the EU. This policy change creates a compelling
quasi-experimental variation to identify the causal effect of mobility on racial
discrimination.
Second, extensive data on the career paths of professional soccer players
can be gathered for most countries over long time periods.5
Third, we can match this extensive individual data with racial informa-
tion. This observable information enables economists to study racial dis-
crimination issues in countries maintaining a “color-blind” model of public
policy. France, for instance, does not collect data on the race or ethnicity of
its citizens and has banned the computerized storage of race-based data.
Fourth, the soccer market offers a simple test for racial discrimination in
salary setting (Szymanski, 2000). Assessing whether a group of workers is
facing wage discrimination is typically difficult because we may not be able to
capture productivity exactly.6 With this caveat in mind, Szymanski’s ‘market
test’ is particularly elegant and parsimonious. Under the assumption that
soccer is an efficient market,7 a team’s wage bill should perfectly reward the
talent of its players. Discrimination can then be said to exist if clubs fielding
3Specifically, in June 1990, at the end of his contract, the former Belgian player Jean-
Marc Bosman wanted to move from Liege in Belgium to Dunkirk in France. Because
Dunkirk refused to meet the transfer fee demand, Liege refused to let him go. Bosman
decided to take his case to the courts and won. As a result, the European Commission
applied European law on worker mobility to the soccer labor market.
4The transfer rate of players from one club to another is statistically different before
and after the Bosman ruling (p-value=0), with an average of 20% of players changing clubs
each season over the 1996-2008 period compared with 13.5% for the 1981-1993 period.
5Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) compiled data of all first-league soccer players for 14
Western European countries since the eighties. We are very grateful to them for sharing
their data with us.
6Using a Mincer-type wage equation, for instance, with a dummy indicating whether
a person belongs to a particular group is plagued by a common estimation problem: how
do we account for unobserved variables? (See Charles and Guryan, 2011).
7Unlike the professional sport labor markets in the US, there are no collective bargaining
agreements, salary caps, or draft picks to maintain a competitive balance between teams.
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Figure 1: Share of foreigners in club squads over time (1981-2008)
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an above-average proportion of black players systematically outperform clubs
with a below-average proportion of black players. This implies that, for a
given wage bill, a team can improve its performance by employing a higher
share of black players and in fine that black players are being paid less than
their talent would warrant. Szymanski finds evidence of discrimination while
performing his test on a panel dataset of professional English clubs between
1978 and 1993, i.e., before the Bosman ruling. We extend the analysis one
step further. First, we theoretically demonstrate why discrimination can
survive in equilibrium with labor mobility constraints. Second, we exploit
the Bosman ruling shock and provide empirical evidence that discrimination
disappears with high mobility. We briefly present these two contributions.
The first contribution consists of establishing a simple theoretical model
to guide our empirical analysis. To derive equilibria in which group differ-
entials persist, we merge ideas from search models of the labor market, à la
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), with a Becker-style assumption of taste for
discrimination.8 Firms are heterogeneous in the talent of the workers whom
they employ, and they offer workers two types of contracts: perfect and im-
perfect contracts. A job offer is considered to be “perfect” when a worker
receives a wage that perfectly rewards his talent. In the case of an imperfect
job offer, the worker earns only a fraction of what his talent is worth and thus
8Altonji and Blank (1999) reviews the pioneering works introducing search into taste-
based theories of discrimination: Borjas and Bronars (1989), Black (1995) and Bowlus and
Eckstein (2002).
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searches on the job. Hence, the firm faces a job offer trade-off between divert-
ing a share of the player’s talent and seeing the player potentially poached
by a rival, which induces a costly turnover.9
We assume that the taste parameter for discrimination affects the job
offer trade-off. A prejudiced firm has lower disutility when it terminates an
employment relationship with disliked workers, and thus, its probability of
offering these workers a perfect job offer is lower. This results in race-based
wage differentials. However, we find that this discriminatory behavior does
not survive in all circumstances. The prejudice does not translate into dis-
crimination when labor mobility is sufficiently low or sufficiently high. The
intuition is straightforward. For a given talent, when mobility is sufficiently
low, firms have high monopsony power and offer imperfect contracts to all
workers, independent of their race.10 By contrast, when mobility is suffi-
ciently high, monopsony power is reduced, and firms offer perfect contracts
to all workers to avoid costly turnovers. In between these extreme cases, the
relationship between labor mobility and racial wage differentials follows an
inverted U-shaped form.
Our model is close to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), where firms are en-
gaged in search.11 In their model, disliked workers are (potentially) less
talented on average and are sought less intensively by prejudiced firms; thus,
these workers receive fewer offers and lower wages and have higher unem-
ployment rates. We complement their analysis by considering that preju-
diced firms do not search less intensively for disliked workers, who have the
same distribution of talents as preferred workers. The prejudice applies to
the separation rate. Prejudiced firms have a lower disutility in parting with
disliked workers. Our results are consistent with Bowlus and Eckstein (2002)
9In Holden and Rosén (2009), firms also offer two types of contracts, high versus low,
depending on a random parameter governing productivity of the job-worker match. In our
setting, the probability of offering a perfect or imperfect contract is endogenized.
10Note that this statement does not imply that all wages are equal, as workers are
heterogeneous in talent, and wages are proportional to talent.
11Black (1995) also introduces taste-based discrimination in a search model. However,
our model deviates from Black’s in three important ways. First, workers rather than firms
are engaging in search. Second, prejudiced firms cannot refuse to hire disliked workers at
any positive wage, and third, workers are also allowed to search on the job.
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and long-term race-base wage differentials. However, as in simpler models,
such as Becker (1957), we predict that discrimination is eliminated through
intensified labor mobility, i.e., increased competition to attract talent.
The second contribution consists of using the Bosman ruling on the En-
glish soccer market to estimate the influence of intensified labor mobility on
discrimination.12 Specifically, we interpret the Bosman ruling as a shock to
job-to-job mobility. Recall that (1) players whose contracts have expired can
now change clubs freely and (2) EU players can move within the EU without
taking up a valuable space in a foreign team’s quota. These two effects make
it easier to “poach” employees and influence firms’ monopsony power.
By comparing the pre- and post-Bosman ruling situation, we identify
the causal effect of intensified mobility on racial discrimination.13 We find
empirical evidence that increasing mobility decreases apparent racial discrim-
ination.14 This result could be important for public policy. If we consider
restrictive contracts to be an important component of the typically nebulous
“labor market frictions,” making it easier for disliked workers to change jobs
and reducing frictions could lower discrimination.
Our result regarding intensified mobility is consistent with Becker’s ar-
gument that intensified product market competition can reduce race-based
differentials caused by prejudice. Using regulatory reforms in U.S banking,
Levine, Levkov, and Rubinstein (2008) show that the exogenous intensifica-
12See Kahn (2000) for a survey on the use of sports to estimate the extent of discrimi-
nation in a much more detailed way than in other industries.
13The Bosman shock has been exploited in other contexts (see Binder and Findlay,
2012, or Kleven, Landais, and Saez, 2013). Kleven et al. (2013) look at changes in the tax
rates and the response by players in order to estimate the effects of higher marginal tax
rates on high-skilled labor. They find that players responded to changes in tax incentives,
especially after the Bosman ruling.
14In a fascinating book documenting how soccer can help economics, Palacios-Huerta
(2014) reviews Szymanski’s paper. Concomitant to our work, Palacios-Huerta extends
Szymanski’s sample from 1993 to 2008 and confirms the absence of discrimination in this
period. His intuition is that the emergence of a market for corporate control of English
professional clubs since the early 1980s has increased the competitiveness of English soccer.
The added competition would have been able to drive discriminating firms out of the
market. This effect may complement our mobility mechanism. However, a potential issue
is that a club experiencing very poor performance simply moves down from one division to
another and is thus not driven out of the soccer market. Our hypothesis is that the labor
market became more competitive primarily because of relaxed constraints on mobility.
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tion of competition among non-financial firms has reduced the manifestation
of racial prejudices in the demand for labor and has raised the wages for
black workers to approach those of equally productive white workers.15
Our paper is also related to more recent works examining the influence
of labor market tightness on discrimination (Biddle and Hamermesh, 2013,
Baert et al, 2014). These studies emphasize that employers discriminate less
in labor markets with a small number of job seekers relative to vacancies.16
By offering more job opportunities, our mobility shock can be interpreted as
a decrease in the ratio of employed job seekers to job offers, as there will be
more competition between firms to attract workers. This situation should
discourage employers from indulging in discriminatory tendencies.17
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section (2), we describe the context
of our analysis and the competitive soccer market. In section (3), we set out
a theoretical model to guide our empirical analysis and to explain how labor
mobility affects discrimination. In section (4), we present the identification
strategy and the specifications of the market test for discrimination. Our
empirical results on discrimination in the English soccer league are presented
in section (5). The most important result is that discrimination disappears
after the Bosman Ruling. Section (7) concludes.
15Other studies trace the impact of competition on relative wages within a single indus-
try. Heywood and Peoples (1994) and Peoples and Talley (2001) find that the deregulation
of transportation industries increased the relative wages of black workers.
16Biddle and Hamermesh (2013) establish that gender discrimination is lower when the
ratio of job seekers to vacancies decreases. The evidence for racial discrimination is less
conclusive, however. Baert et al (2014) sent resumes to firms in industries with different
labor market tightness. In sectors with few available workers and a large number of
vacancies, the difference in call-back rates between resumes with Flemish-sounding names
and those with Turkish-sounding names was almost zero, whereas it was significantly lower
in “loose” labor markets.
17The Bosman ruling shock may have also increased competition among workers by
offering firms a larger pool of job seekers. However, to the extent that firms pay a turnover
cost when workers quit, their monopsony power is reduced by the increased mobility of
the labor market.
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2 The competitive market for soccer players
We have already discussed the four important advantages offered by the
soccer market to the study of mobility and discrimination: (1) large observed
variation in labor mobility following the Bosman ruling; (2) an extensive
collection of data on the career paths of professional soccer players, (3) a
match between individual data and race information; and (4) a simple test for
racial discrimination in salary setting (Szymanski, 2000). We now describe
the competitiveness of the soccer market.
The data are similar to those of Szymanski (2000) but differ in scope
and time. In terms of scope, Szymanski uses a panel of 39 clubs from four
divisions in the English soccer league over the 1978-1993 period. Thanks to
Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013), our dataset contains all professional soccer
players, regardless of nationality, from the first league in England.18 In terms
of time, we extend Szymanski’s sample to cover the post-Bosman era, from
1994 to 2008. Despite differences in scope and time, the most salient features
remain.
First, league competition is hierarchical, focused on league rankings with-
out play-offs. Each year, approximately 20 teams participate in the English
first league. At the end of each season the worst-performing teams swap
places with the highest-ranked teams in the second league. There are no
collective bargaining agreements, salary caps, or draft picks to maintain a
competitive balance between teams.
Second, clubs are heterogeneous in wage bills. To illustrate this idea,
we use wage bills from the Companies House website, a British government
agency that collects annual reports from registered companies. Precise wage
data are provided for almost all the English clubs in our sample.19 These wage
data are considered reliable because they are obtained from audited annual
18We only have access to information on professional players from the top league, but
our number of clubs is fairly similar to that in Szymanski’s sample: 41 teams from 1981
to 1993.
19We are missing some data from clubs who have gone bankrupt during the season, such
as Crystal Palace in 1998 or Leicester City in 2001, or from clubs that did not report wage
bills in their financial accounts.
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accounts.20 One problem, however, is that we do not know what proportion
of the pay is incentive related (e.g., bonuses for performing well in a cup
competition) and what proportion is fixed. Another problem is that the
wage bill is given for all staff at a soccer club, not only the players. Salaries
for scouts, statisticians, physiotherapists, and coaches are also included in
the wage bill. However, this practice is unlikely to be a problem because the
pay for most of these employees is small compared with player wages and
likely accounts for a similar share of the wage bills in all clubs.
In Figure (2), we report the log of the clubs’ wage bills in the English
first league from 1981 to 2008. Three facts are worth mentioning. First, each
season (year), we observe variation in the wage bills across clubs. Second,
we note that wage bills are linearly increasing over the years for all clubs.
Third, remarkably, this linear positive trend is not affected by the Bosman
ruling. A common explanation for this trend is the increasing price of talent.
Figure 2: Wage Bills in the English First League (1981-2008)
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Third, soccer is a competitive market for talent. Players earn wages
that reflect their talent, and the club’s wage bill, which is a sum of all this
20Unfortunately, the reports are not homogeneous, as they sometimes use different start-
ing and ending dates. In situations in which the wage bill reported was for a period of
twelve months, we left the wages unchanged. Over the 30-year period, some companies
changed the ending date on their company accounts. Such changes led to some annual
accounts reporting thirteen or more months of data, in which case the data were adjusted
on a pro rata basis.
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talent, explains the club’s ranking quite well. Using clubs’ wage bill data
and computing an index of performance based on league rankings (see 4.3 for
detailed computation), we confirm that the English soccer market is quite
competitive. Wage expenditures on players and performance are heavily
correlated in the English league between 1981 and 2008. This correlation is
depicted in Figure (3) and holds despite the surge in player remuneration
(see Figure 2).
Figure 3: Average Wage bill and Performance in the English First League (1981-
2008)
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3 Theoretical framework
We establish an equilibrium labor market search model in the style of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), in which firms are homogeneous in size because the
number of players per team is fairly rigid. Firms are instead heterogeneous
in their wage bills (see section 2). We assume that a club’s budget is given
and is spent searching for talent and paying wages. In this search setting,
we introduce racial discrimination. We assume that some employers hold a
‘taste’ for racial discrimination, meaning that there is a disamenity value of
employing disliked workers.21 If this assumption holds, then disliked workers
21In the final discussion (see section 7) we present some evidence of the persistence of
this ‘taste’ or prejudice over time.
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should ‘compensate’ prejudiced employers by being more productive at a
given wage or, equivalently, by accepting a lower wage for an identical level of
productivity. However, Becker (1957) argues that prejudice against disliked
workers does not necessarily result in economic discrimination and race-based
wage differentials. In other words, a taste for discrimination does not mean
economic discrimination at the margin. Without some market failure, these
wage differentials should be eliminated with competition. Using a job search
model, we study the role of constraints on job-to-job mobility as a market
failure. Specifically, we show that limited mobility, as was the case before
the Bosman ruling, may explain race-based wage differentials. This result is
formalized below.
We first present worker behavior (3.1), the flow conditions (3.2) and firm
behavior (3.3) before introducing the role of taste discrimination(3.4). We
solve the model analytically and present some simulations as an illustration
of our results on wage discrimination (3.5) and job turnover (3.6).
3.1 Workers
The mass L of workers is divided into two types according to their appear-
ance, A and B. Type B could be discriminated against by employers. All
workers are heterogeneous in talent independent of their type, and each type
has the same distribution of talent. The decision problem faced by a worker
in a traditional job search model is simple (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen,
1998); he maximizes utility over an infinite horizon in continuous time by
adopting a reservation wage strategy that is state dependent. At any mo-
ment in time, each worker is either unemployed (state 0) or employed (state
1). Firms are engaged in search, and, at random time intervals, workers
receive information about new or alternative jobs. This information is en-
capsulated in the parameter of the Poisson arrival process, λ, which denotes
the arrival rate of job offers. This parameter reflects the general state of the
labor market, specifically contracting rules, institutional constraints on and
barriers to mobility. This market parameter also depends on the worker’s
current situation (employed or not). We thus assume that workers search
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more intensively while unemployed (state 0) than while employed (state 1),
i.e. λ0 > λ1. Job-worker matches are destroyed at an exogenous positive
rate, δ.
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral, with the discount rate r. Workers
must respond to offers as soon as they arrive. The wage (ω) that they
receive is function of their talent, t, such that ω = kt, where 0 < k ≤ 1.
Workers accept the job offer if it pays a higher wage while employed or if
the instantaneous utility of being unemployed is lower than that of being
employed.
In this wage posting framework, firms have monopsony power.22 When a
firm does not exercise its monopsony power, k = 1, and the worker receives
a wage that perfectly rewards his talent, t, such that ω = t. Because this
perfect job offer is the best offer that the can receive with talent t, the worker
remains with the employer. By contrast, when a firm exercises its monopsony
power, k < 1, and the worker receives an “imperfect” or bad job offer. This
implies that the worker receives a wage that is equal to only a fraction of
his talent. Because his talent is imperfectly rewarded and because soccer is
a market for talent (see section 2), the worker searches on the job. However,
the probability of receiving a perfect job offer, γ, depends on the state of the
labor market and on firm behavior (which is described in subsection 3.3).
Given this framework, the expected discounted utility of a job-seeker
when unemployed, U , can be expressed as follows:
rU = b+ λ0(γWP + (1− γ)WI − U), (1)
where WP and WI are the discounted values of filling a perfect and an
imperfect offer, respectively. Equation (1) is rather standard (e.g., Pissarides,
1990). Being unemployed is similar to holding an asset. This asset pays a
dividend of b, the unemployment benefit, and it has a probability λ0(1− γ)
of being transformed into a bad match, in which case the worker obtains WI
and loses U . It also has a probability λ0γ of being transformed into a good
match, yielding a capital gain of WP .
22Evidence of monopsony power in sport is documented in Kahn (2000).
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For the sake of simplicity, we derive the discounted present value of em-
ployment in an imperfect match, WI , for a given value of k rather than a
continuous distribution as follows:
rWI = kt+ λ1γ(WP −WI) + δ(U −WI), (2)
and for a perfect match as
rWP = t+ δ(U −WP ). (3)
Equations (2) and (3) have an intuition similar to that of equation (1).
If a job seeker finds a perfect job, then he accepts the offer and remains in
the job until an exogenous separation process moves him to unemployment
(equation 3). If the job that he finds is bad or imperfect, then he rejects it if
he is already employed, whereas if he is unemployed, he accepts the job and
continues to search on the job. He remains in the job until either quitting to
obtain a better job or an exogenous separation (equation 2).
Observe also that those equations are written under the assumption that
U is always smaller than WI (and WP ). Because this condition holds, there
is no “waiting” behavior in this model, as an individual who receives a bad
offer cannot hold out to receive a good offer. His reservation wage is such
that it is always beneficial to accept an imperfect match.23
3.2 Flow conditions
As jobs are identical apart from the wage associated with their talent, em-
ployed workers move from lower- to higher- paying jobs as the opportunities
arise. Workers also move from employment to unemployment and vice versa.
We use standard equilibrium conditions (e.g., Mortensen 1988) to solve for
the steady-state equilibrium labor supply. In the steady state, all flows must
be balanced for there to be a stable equilibrium. Thus, we find three equilib-
rium conditions to determine the equilibrium shares of unemployed (u) and
employed workers in perfect (P ) or imperfect (I) jobs. Flows in and out of
23Given the high wages of soccer players, this assumption does not seem to be outlandish.
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unemployment have to balance (i), as well as flows in and out from imperfect
(ii) and perfect (iii) jobs:
i. Unemployment flows have to balance:
λ0u = δ(1− u)⇒ u = δ
λ0 + δ
. (4)
ii. Number of flows out of imperfect matches are equal to number of flows
into imperfect matches
I(δ + λ1γ) = λ0(1− γ)u⇒ I = λ0(1− γ)δ
(δ + λ1γ)(δ + λ0)
. (5)
iii. Number of flows out of perfect matches are equal to number of flows
into perfect matches
δP = λ1γI + λ0γu⇒ P = λ1γλ0(1− γ)
(δ + λ1γ)(δ + λ0)
+
λ0γ
(λ0 + δ)
. (6)
3.3 Firms
Based on the firm’s behavior, we endogenize the probability of offering a
perfect job offer, γ. Firms maximize utility (a function of profits) by offering
a wage for workers depending on their talent (the role of appearance will
be determined in the next subsection). Their reason for offering a perfect or
imperfect job offer arises from the tension between diverting a share (1−k) of
the worker’s talent and seeing the worker potentially poached by a rival firm
at the rate λ1γ, which induces a turnover cost c > 0. In this model, we do
not detail how workers and firms are matched. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume a random match. Once a random match is made, the firm’s expected
profits or value functions for offering a perfect (JP ) or imperfect (JI) contract
for a given talent can be determined.
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rJI = (1− k)t+ (δ + λ1γ)(V − JI − c)
⇔ JI = (1− k)t+ (δ + λ1γ)(V − c)
r + (δ + λ1γ)
, (7)
rJP = δ(V − JP − c(t))⇔ JP = δ[V − c]
r + δ
. (8)
The equation for the imperfect job offer (7) states that the value of choos-
ing the offer is equal to what the firm can divert, ([1− k]t), minus the loss
that occurs from the player being poached (V − JI − c) with V the value
of a vacancy. We assume that when a worker leaves the firm, a vacancy is
created; however because the turnover cost is positive, the firm incurs a loss
whenever a worker leaves. A worker leaves a firm for two reasons: either
through the exogenous separation process, which occurs at rate δ, or because
a rival firm has poached the worker, which occurs at rate λ1γ. When the firm
offers a perfect job offer, the worker can leave only through the exogenous
separation process.
From the equations above, we can easily find that:24
JP > JI ⇔ δ[V − c(t)]
r + δ
>
(1− k)t+ (δ + λ1γ)(V − c(t))
r + (δ + λ1γ)
⇔ c(t) > (1− k)t(r + δ)
λ1γr
. (9)
We assume that c follows a Pareto distribution with a lower turnover cost
bound c˜ and shape parameter α ≥ 0. This assumption implies a distribution
of turnover cost draws given by
G(c) =
(c
c˜
)−α
, c ∈ [c˜,∞].
24We use here a result that is standard in the search literature: in a steady-state equi-
librium, free entry ensures that the value of a vacancy is zero. Thus: V = 0.
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The shape parameter α indexes the dispersion of turnover cost draws.
The Pareto parametrization of c is intuitive because most turnover costs are
low, but as α increases, the relative number of high turnover costs increases,
and the cost distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels.
Assuming that c is distributed Pareto and convex in talent, such that c(t) =
ct2, yields a simple closed-form solution for γ. The probability of receiving a
perfect offer is such that JP > JI :
γ(t) =
(
c˜λ1γrt
(r + δ)(1− k)
)α
=
(
c˜λ1rt
(r + δ)(1− k)
) α
1−α
. (10)
As shown in equation (10), the probability γ depends primarily on three
important variables: λ1, k, and t. Everything else being equal, λ1 determines
the strength of the firm’s monopsony power. For a high value of λ1, firms are
less likely to propose low wage offers to employees because they anticipate
that other firms can poach these workers. Thus, a high λ1 not only directly
decreases the number of employees that are stuck in imperfect matches (see
equation 5) but also reduces the probability of being in an imperfect match
by increasing γ. Equation (10) gives an indirect channel through which a high
λ1 can decrease wage differences (and thus discrimination) among workers.
The effect of the other parameters is straightforward: as k increases,
firms can divert a smaller share of the monetary value of a worker’s talent;
therefore giving an imperfect offer to a worker is less attractive. Regarding
talent t, we assume that workers who are more talented are more costly to
replace. This assumption seems reasonable but depends on the convexity of
the turnover cost.
3.4 Employer prejudice
We assume that some firms hold a ‘taste’ for discrimination. In this spirit,
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Bowlus et al. 2001 consider that the arrival
rates (λs) and the job destruction rate (δ) vary according to the type of
worker (A and B). Recall that employers can discriminate against type B.
Accordingly, the arrival rates of job offers for type B workers from prejudiced
16
firms are lower than those for A workers. It seems natural to assume that,
if an employer does not like a particular type of worker, then lower efforts
would be made by the employer and the worker to meet one another. This
implies that λi,A ≥ λi,B for i = 0, 1. Despite this natural assumption, we
simplify the analysis and assume that λs and δ do not vary according to
prejudice, such that δA = δB and λi = λi,A = λi,B for i = 0, 1.
This simplification has two main advantages. The first is abstracting
from explicit discriminatory hiring practices. The λ parameters reflect the
general state of the labor market, and thus, the potential constraints on labor
mobility. Holding everything else constant, lower constraints on job-to-job
mobility are associated with a higher arrival rate of job offers. Therefore,
in our context, the end of both transfer fees for out-of-contract players and
quotas within the EU imply that players receive a higher number of job
offers from a larger number of firms after the Bosman ruling than they did
before. It is thus reasonable to assume that λ1 is higher after the ruling
than before the ruling because of the different states of the labor market.25
Furthermore, assuming also different values of λ1 for types A and B would
add a complication by introducing discriminatory hiring practices related to
different search intensities (i.e., λ1,A 6= λ1,B).
The second reason for this simplification is that models based on Mortensen
(1988) have unrealistic, right-skewed wage distributions. This problem does
not occur in our model, as the wage distribution depends on the distribution
of talent.26
In our approach, we assume that the two groups of workers, A and B,
differ in their probability of drawing a perfect match, γ. These two groups
have different Pareto distributions governing the turnover cost. In particu-
lar, consider the case in which c˜B = c˜A − d, where d represents the taste for
discrimination and c˜ represents the lower bound cost, such that the Pareto
distribution of the turnover cost for B workers is shifted to the left. In our
particular labor context, this shift to the left reflects the taste for discrim-
25We may also consider different values of λ0 before and after the Bosman ruling, but
we abstract from this complication to focus our attention on the role of λ1.
26Because talent and productivity are often Pareto distributed, adopting the same ap-
proach would give us a more plausible left-skewed distribution for wages.
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ination d and the idea that a type B player who is unlikely to be a fan or
manager favorite will be less costly to let go or easier to replace. This as-
sumption gives us a lower equilibrium value of γ for individuals in group B
compared with those in group A.
From this assumption on γ, we can ground Szymanski’s market test.
Assume that a firm faces a budget constraint.27 Then revenues (R), from
the overall team performance, are equal to the club’s wage bill (Ω). We can
write this down as:
Ω = R = (1− µ)(γAtA + (1− γA)ktA) + µ(γBtB + (1− γB)ktB),
where µ is the share of black players in the squad, and ti is the talent of an
i = A,B type player. Consider two teams with different shares µ of black
players but with same revenues. Because γB is lower, they will have a lower
wage bill for the same talent. Firms that hire more black players increase
their performance compared with those that do not, which is exactly what
Szymanski’s market test aims to estimate.
3.5 Wage discrimination
Our perspective is that the Bosman ruling modifies the general state of the
labor market. In particular, this modification affects the job-to-job mobility
parameter, i.e., the arrival rates of job offers for employed workers (λ1). We
thus consider the effect of different values of λ1 on wage discrimination.
We define wage discrimination as the difference in expected wages between
individuals in groups A and B, such as:
EA(ω|t)− EB(ω|t) = buA + ktIA + tPA − buB − ktIB − tPB. (11)
After some algebraic manipulation (reported in appendix A.1) and given
that both groups have the same likelihood of being out of work, equation (10)
27This budget constraint is not necessarily binding in the sort-run, since many clubs
post a deficit in a any given year. However, in the medium-run, clubs who overspend can
go bankrupt, for instance Crystal Palace in 1999, Leicester in 2001, Leeds United and
Portsmouth in 2010.
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reduces to
EA(w|t)−EB(w|t) = tλ0δ(γA− γB)
(
(1− k)(λ1 + δ)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
. (12)
In this expression, there is clearly no wage discrimination if λ1 = 0 or
γA = γB, i.e., if job-to-job mobility is null or if the probability of receiving a
good job does not depend on the type of worker.
We now investigate how this wage discrimination varies when we mod-
ify the job-to-job mobility parameter. With everything else held equal, the
effect of a higher λ1 on discrimination is twofold: it not only directly de-
creases the steady-state share of individuals in bad or imperfect matches I
(see equation 5) but also increases the likelihood of receiving a perfect offer,
γ (equation 10).
Overall, through γ, the effect of λ1 on discrimination is non-linear. For
values of λ1 close to 0, firms anticipate that their players cannot be poached
and both A and B players ultimately receive imperfect wage offers. In this
extreme case, there is no discrimination because A and B players with the
same talent earn the same wage. As λ1 increases, discrimination also begins
to increase because all firms endogenize the taste for discrimination of preju-
diced firms (i.e., γA ≥ γB). Thus, as job-to-job mobility increases, A players
receive better offers than B players, and wage discrimination increases for a
given level of talent. Then, as mobility continues to increase, the process is
reversed. B players begin receiving a high number of perfect job offers. As
a result, the gap narrows and even disappears when mobility is sufficiently
high. Formally we state this in Proposition (1).
Proposition 1. The difference in expected wage is a parabola that has a
single maximum.
Proof. Appendix (A.2) presents the proof.
To gauge the effect of an increase in job-to-job mobility on wage discrim-
ination, we simulate the effect of an increase in λ1 on E(ω|t) using plausible
parameter values.28
28Although our labor market differs greatly from the market analyzed by Bowlus, we
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Figure 4: Wage Expectation
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As shown in figure (5), an increase in job-to-job mobility (captured by
higher values of λ1) can either decrease or increase discrimination in our
model, even if it improves outcomes for workers of both type A and type B
as depicted in figure (4).
3.6 Job turnover
Our model also offers strong predictions regarding the turnover of type A
and B workers, which affects the wage discrimination pattern. We establish
in appendix (A.3) that there exists an optimal job offer arrival rate, such
that type A workers change firms more often than B workers when below
this rate, and less often when above it.
In our model, it is easy to find the expression for job turnover in a given
period: λ1γI. For each group, A and B, this expression yields an inverse
U-shaped curve linking λ1 and job turnover. There are two reasons that job
turnover is low at both extremes of this curve. First, for low values of λ1,
few firms offer contracts to employed workers; thus, workers have a small
likelihood of moving between firms. Second, there is an additional effect of
use the same values for the parameters employed in both papers. We hope that this
methodological choice will allow the reader to better gauge the fit of our model. The
parameter values for the simulations are tabulated in appendix C.
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Figure 5: Wage discrimination
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λ1 on γ. When λ1 is low, γ is also low; hence, even when employed workers
receive a job offer, it is likely to be imperfect and thus rejected. Then, as
λ1 and γ increase, players move to take advantage of the new perfect job
offers. However, as λ1 increases, a “stock” effect comes into play: workers are
less likely to move simply because those who accept the offer to change jobs
(I) are much less numerous. Moreover, because a higher λ1 implies a higher
γ, workers are also likely to receive better offers. These two effects explain
why mobility follows an inverse U-shaped curve. As λ1 increases, the pool of
workers who want to change clubs (I) decreases, as does the number of moves
(λIγ). The differentiated turnover between A and B thus derives from the
differences in γ: the “stock” effect emerges earlier for A type workers. This
pattern is stated formally in Proposition (2).
Proposition 2. An increase in job-to-job mobility causes a racially differ-
entiated change in job turnover.
Proof. Appendix (A.3) presents the proof.
As depicted in Figure (6), our simulation illustrates Proposition (2) and
what was explained above.
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Figure 6: Job turnover
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3.7 Model conclusions
Our model provides a plausible explanation of why wage discrimination could
have decreased post-Bosman despite the prejudice of some firms: if the job
offer arrival rate increases, wages rise through two different channels. First,
workers are more likely to receive “perfect” job offers. Second, the monop-
sony power of firms decreases because their employees are more likely to be
poached.
Another interesting aspect of our model is that it predicts an unambigu-
ous rise in wages following an increase in efficiency on-the-job search. In
fact, wages have skyrocketed following the Bosman ruling, as depicted in a
previous graph (see Figure 2).
In conclusion, our model fits a large number of empirical facts that were
or will be stated in the next sections: an increase in wages, a racially differ-
entiated effect on job turnover and a decrease in discrimination should follow
an increase in job-to-job mobility.
4 Empirical strategy
This section describes how we move from our theory to empirics. To do
so, we first present the market test to detect discrimination and discuss our
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data on racial information, its sources and its limitations (subsection 4.1).
We then explain how we use the Bosman shock and present some descriptive
statistics (subsection 4.2). Finally, we present the equations that we estimate
to evaluate the extent of race-based wage discrimination (subsection 4.3).
4.1 The market test for discrimination
Our empirical results are based on Szymanski’s market test. The intuition
behind this test is that a team’s performance is a good indicator of the team’s
talent. Thus, if all individual talent is perfectly rewarded, i.e., ω = t as in
our model, then the team’s wage bill should perfectly reflect its overall per-
formance. Crucially, this performance should be independent of the team’s
racial composition when we control for the wage bill. By contrast, for a
given wage bill, if teams fielding an above-average proportion of black play-
ers systematically outperform clubs with a below-average proportion of black
players, then the labor market may be unfair toward black players (i.e., their
talent is not fully rewarded and they face wage discrimination). Szyman-
ski’s market test is perfectly compatible with our theoretical framework (see
subsection 3.4).
This test requires race information that we can match with extensive
individual data. The race information was coded from an examination of
players’ photographs into categories of either black or not black (which we
refer to as white). This method might sound arbitrary because we code
players as “black” if they appear to be “black”. However, this method is
actually a good way to model the potential for discrimination because dis-
criminators prejudge an individual based on appearances (Palacios-Huerta,
2014).29 These pictures were obtained primarily from the reputable website
transfermarkt.de, and when pictures from that site were not available, we
29For an explanation of why this appearance-based method is appropriate, Palacios-
Huerta (2014) considers the case of the legendary Manchester United player Ryan Giggs.
He appears to be Caucasian, and it was unlikely that he faced discrimination as a pro-
fessional player during his career because discriminators prejudge an individual based on
appearances. However, after he became famous, he publicly revealed that he had been
victim of racism as a child because of his father’s skin color. This revelation came as a
surprise to his fans.
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conducted Internet searches. We obtained pictures for nearly all the players
in our sample. The players whose photos were missing were primarily youth
team players who had had little game time and could thus be discarded from
our analysis.
In addition to information on race, we added precise data on nationality,
age, the number of matches played, the number of goals scored, national team
selections (and their level - youth, A, ...), and whether a player participated
in the World Cup. We use these last measures to create an objective, albeit
imperfect, measure of quality of the players. Moreover, we added ranking
and attendance information30 to the club’s wage bill and performance data
(see section 2).
4.2 The Bosman shock and the identification strategy
We apply the market test for discrimination to a panel of all English clubs
in the top league from 1981 to 2008, and we explore the Bosman ruling as an
exogenous mobility shock to the European soccer labor market. The Bosman
ruling was decided on December 15, 1995, by the European Court of Justice.
This important decision lifted restrictions on soccer player mobility based
on the European Community Treaty of the free movement of labor (article
39). This decision had a profound effect on transfers in the European soccer
market by banning restrictions on foreign EU players within national leagues
and by allowing players in the EU to move to another club at the end of a
contract without a transfer fee being paid. Though this decision came into
force in December 1995, it could have been anticipated because this case
had been submitted to the Court on October 6, 1993. Thus, in December
1993, the European Union of Football Associations amended the regulations
governing the Status and Transfer of Football Players. This amendment
provided that a player may enter into a contract with a new club when the
contract between him and his club has expired, has been rescinded or will
expire within six months. However, the two clubs were still forced to agree
on a transfer fee with a specific action in case of disagreement. To prevent
30From the European soccer statistics website.
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any contamination of the results caused by a possible anticipation, we omit
the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 seasons. We thus compare the pre-Bosman era
(1981-1993) to the post-Bosman era (1996-2008) to identify the causal effect
of intensified mobility on racial discrimination.
Exploiting this shock and using our extensive player data, we constructed
some informative descriptive statistics. We have information on 13,507 play-
ers who participated in the first English league during our two period; 77%
of those players are English.31 It is worth noting that this number was higher
before the Bosman ruling (94.7%) than after (61.9%) it. In total, 12.7% of
players are English and black; this number is fairly stable before (11.9%) and
after (13.5%) Bosman. However, the number of black non-English players
has skyrocketed from 0.7% before 1995 to 13% after the ruling. The con-
sequence is that the number of white English players decreased from 82.8%
before the ruling to 48.5% after the ruling.
Our strategy amounts to comparing black English to white English play-
ers to avoid comparing players of different nationalities. Table (1) presents
information on the average number of matches per player, player quality
and the age of the players across the two groups, both before and after the
Bosman ruling. Among the different characteristics displayed in Table (1),
we observe in the pre-Bosman period that black players did not play more
matches or were not less tenured than white players. By contrast, we ob-
serve that these players were slightly more qualified and one year younger.
In the post-Bosman era, the notable changes as follows: the quality differ-
ence is reduced (with p < 0.1), and black players have 6 fewer months of
tenure. Interestingly, all the differences in differences are significant. In the
pre-Bosman period, black players played more matches, performed better in
terms of quality, were 6 months younger and had 6 fewer months of tenure.
Those statistics clearly show that there was a Bosman effect on players and
that this change differed along racial lines.
The difference between the pre- and post-Bosman eras is also observed
31We use the term English for the sake of comparison with Szymanski (2000), but a
minority of those players are Irish, Scottish or Welsh. This naming makes sense in our
context because these players were not considered foreigners in the English soccer market
and were thus not subject to the foreign quotas.
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Table 1: Individual differences in means
Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008) Overall
Variable Black White Diff. Black White Diff D in D
Player’s number of matches 20.77 20.24 .54 18.28 17.70 .59 2.48a
(.48) (.43) (.25)
Player’s quality level 1.94 1.74 .20a 2.26 2.16 .10c -.42a
(.05) (.05) (.03)
Age of players 24.07 25.01 -0.94a 24.92 25.59 -0.67a -.56a
(.15) (.15) (.09)
Tenure (in years) 2.55 2.49 .06 2.65 3.06 -.41a -.48a
(.09) (.07) (.04)
Observations 904 5938 980 3531
Notes: we compare here black and white English players in the first league. Diff. means Difference in means
and D in D means Difference in Difference. Standard errors in parentheses, with a denoting significance at the
1% level.
in Table (2) using club statistics. All differences in terms of budget, transfer
fee records, average attendance and club quality levels are highly significant
both economically and statistically. The only exception is the share of black
English players, which is constant in both eras, as shown above.
Table 2: Club differences in means
Variable Pre-Bosman Post-Bosman Difference
(1981-1993) (1996-2008)
Budget (in millions) 2,9 35,5 3,2a
(1,5)
Transfer fee record (in millions) 1,31 8,96 7,65a
(0,38)
Average attendance (in thousands) 21,5 33,2 11,7a
(0,9)
Share of black players 0.13 0.14 0.01
(0.01)
Club’s quality level 23.5 31.1 7.56a
(.64)
Observations 304 258
Notes: we compare here English first league clubs. Standard errors in parentheses, with a
denoting significance at the 1% level.
As mentioned in the model, we should also expect a racially differentiated
change in job turnover to accompany a change in the job offer arrival rate. In
our empirical context, we define job turnover as club transfers, i.e., moving
from one club to another during a given season. Figure (7) contrasts the
turnover of black (B) and white (A) English players by comparing their
share in the total number of transfers with respect to their share in the total
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population. The variable analyzed is the following:
Turnover =
Share in transfersB
Share in populationB
− Share in transfersW
Share in populationW
This variable is positive if black players change clubs more often in a
given year than their white colleagues and negative if they do not.
Figure 7: Relative turnover of black English players
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As shown in Figure (7), before the Bosman ruling, white players tended to
change clubs more often than black players, but this tendency was reversed
after Bosman. However, it is unclear when precisely this trend reversed.32
We also find evidence, presented in part (B) of the appendix, that young
black players took advantage of the new ruling to change clubs when they
could have been discriminated against. How did all these changes affect wage
discrimination? In the next subsection, we present the specifications that will
enable us to estimate whether discrimination is present in the soccer labor
market.
4.3 Estimated equations
To apply Szymanski’s test, relating a club’s performance to its wage bill (or
budget) and its share of black English players, we use two different mea-
32This may be because we imperfectly observe club transfers. We have data on the first
division only, so what we are measuring are transfers within the first division. This may
explain our outlying data point for the season 1991-1992, a season where four clubs were
promoted and whose transfers we do not perfectly capture.
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sures of performance. The first measure is based on league rankings as in
Szymanski’s paper. The second is based on match results. In both cases,
we corroborate Szymanski’s finding of apparent wage discrimination in the
pre-Bosman era. However, consistent with our theoretical predictions on the
effect of relaxed mobility constraints, we find that wage discrimination has
disappeared in the post-Bosman era.
The league performance specification
League Performanceit = αi + β1(WageBillit −WageBillt)
+ β2(PlayersNbit − PlayersNbt)
+ β3(Shareblackit − Shareblackt) + it. (13)
In specification (13), our dependent variable, League Performanceit, is
computed based on the final ranking of club’s i at the end of season t.33
αi is a team i fixed effect, capturing permanent team-specific characteristics
affecting performance, such as a location effect that allows clubs to underpay
players, and it is the usual error term. The team’s wage bill (WageBillit −
WageBillt) is measured as the log difference of the club wage bill relative to
the annual average (WageBillt). The relative number of players (PlayerNbit−
PlayerNbt) is computed as the difference between the number of players used
in a season t and a club i relative to the average. This variable controls for
“bad luck,” as high turnover typically reflects a high level of injuries sustained.
Finally, the relative share of black players (Shareblackit − Shareblackt) is
measured as the share of black players’ appearances for a team in a given
season t relative to the annual average (Shareblackt). We first compute this
ratio based only on the share of black English players (see footnote 31). The
share of black English players is relatively stable over time, but the share
33Note that as opposed to US team sports, there are no play-offs, and competition
is solely about the ranking in the league. Specifically, League Performance is equal to
Rankingit−mint
maxt−mint , where min and max are the lowest and highest rankings possible for clubs
at the end of the season. This transformation changes the sign of the discrimination effect
compared to Szymanski’s paper (see below), but not the main conclusions.
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of black non-English players is constantly rising, which would lead us to
estimate discrimination toward different individuals before and after Bosman.
We later discuss results based on both black and white non-English players.
The coefficient of interest to us is β3, the effect of the share of black players
on performance. In case of race based wage discrimination, we expect β3 to
be positive.34
The match performance specification
One drawback of the previous measure of team performance based on final
rankings is the relatively limited number of observations. We thus consider a
new measure based on match results. Because the result of any given match
is subject to some randomness or luck, there is a great deal of unexplained
variance. However, using this measure, we obtain many more observations
and can condition the performance between team i and team j on match
fixed effects (ξij). Our specification on match performance is:
Match Performanceijt = ξij + β1 log(WageBillit/WageBilljt)
+ β2(PlayersNbit − PlayersNbjt)
+ β3(Shareblackit − Shareblackjt) + eijt, (14)
Our new dependent variable, Match Performanceijt between team i and
team j in year t, is simply the goal difference in the match between the
two teams. Using this new variable, we apply the same idea to test for
discrimination: for a given difference in the wage bill between teams i and j, a
team i with a higher share of black players should not consistently outperform
(in terms of goals) a team j with a lower share. By contrast, we expect large
differences in wage bills that explain large differences in talent, to lead to large
differences in performance and thus to large differences in goals scored. Our
wage bill variable is the log difference between the budgets of the two clubs
34Compared with Szymanski, our transformation of the dependent variable implies, more
intuitively, that in case of discrimination, an increase in the relative share of black players
raises team’s performance.
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(
log[WageBillit/WageBilljt]
)
.35 We also add the difference in the number of
players used (PlayersNbit−PlayersNbjt). eijt is the usual error term. Finally,
our variable of interest is the difference between the two teams in the share
of matches played by black English players (Shareblackit − Shareblackjt).36
The results are presented below.
5 Empirical results
We estimate models (13) and (14) with different panel data techniques in
subsections (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. The combination of different speci-
fications and estimators reinforces the robustness of our results.
5.1 Discrimination market test on league performance
We first use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and the fixed-effects
“within” estimator to eliminate the individual effect (αi), with standard errors
robust to clustering (because clubs are likely to be highly dependent across
years). We then instrument for the wage bill by relying on the within-IV
approach and the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The latter
estimator is useful, first, because it also eliminates the club fixed effects
(through first-differencing) and, second, because it allows for a wide panel of
instruments at the expense of removing some observations from our sample.
Estimation by OLS and Within
In Table (3), we first show our pre- and post-Bosman results using the
discrimination market test on league rankings (equation 13) without instru-
menting for the wage budget.37 The relative wage bill variable has a positive
35Log differences are necessary because of the large increase in wage bills over time.
Otherwise, we would not be able to pool our observations together.
36Unfortunately, we do not have team sheet data that would enable us to control the
number of black players that are on the pitch at the match level.
37We exclude one year from the beginning estimation to ensure the use of the same
sample period data for the instruments and the Arellano-Bond estimation. We also ex-
clude the years 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 to avoid any anticipation effect. Therefore, this
estimation is performed for the 1981-1982 to 1993-1994 seasons for the pre-Bosman period
and for 1996-1997 to 2008-2009 seasons for the post-Bosman period.
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effect on performance, which is economically and statistically significant. Un-
surprisingly, this effect is larger if we do not control for the club fixed effect.
The relative number of players used exhibits a negative effect in line with
“bad luck” because high turnover typically reflects a high level of injuries
sustained. As expected, we find contrasting results across the two periods
for our estimate of interest: the estimates for the share of black English play-
ers. Controlling for the number of players used and the team’s wage bill, we
find apparent discrimination in the pre-Bosman era (columns 1 and 2). Dur-
ing this period, the performance depends significantly on the team’s racial
composition. Therefore, teams fielding an above-average proportion of black
players outperform clubs with a below-average proportion of black players.
After Bosman, the apparent wage discrimination disappears. Performance is
now independent of the racial composition of teams.
Table 3: Market-test: League Performance and Discrimination - OLS and Within
Dependent Variable: Relative League Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Estimator: OLS Within OLS Within
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative log wage bill 0.509a 0.396a 0.474a 0.157b
(0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.08)
Share of black English players 0.577a 0.491b -0.130 -0.000
employed (0.18) (0.25) (0.15) (0.20)
Relative number of players used -0.025a -0.031a -0.026a -0.027a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 262 259 258 251
R2 0.438 0.606
Club fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Notes: the dependent variable Relative League Performance is equal to Rankingit−mintmaxt−mint . Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by club, with a, b denoting significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
How economically meaningful is the estimate of discrimination? Let us
compare the 1993 situation of two clubs that are identical except in their
share of black English players. The “prejudiced” club does not employ black
players, either because it cannot poach them or because it cannot retain
them, whereas the “unprejudiced” club employs the 1993 average number of
black players, i.e., 3.7 players. Based on the within estimates of column (2),
we find that to obtain the same performance, the prejudiced club should pay
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800,000 pounds more than the unprejudiced club. This value amounts to
15% of the average wage bill in 1993.
Estimation by Within-IV and GMM
Are our results plagued by endogeneity problems? Two possible problems
are worth mentioning: (1) the potential mismeasurement of the wage bills,
and (2) the fact that bonuses result in reverse causation because a higher per-
formance may induce higher bonuses and thus a higher wage bill (if salary is
incentive based). To address these problems, which could bias the estimate
of the share of black players, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
We instrument the wage bill with the lagged performance on cups, lagged at-
tendance, and relative record transfer fees.38 The key identifying assumption
is that these variables do not affect current final league performance apart
from the wage bill.
We briefly discuss the relevance of our three excluded instruments. First,
good performance in cups in the previous season should generate higher rev-
enues in the contemporaneous season. Thus, there should be a strong link
between the lagged year attendance in the stadium and the contemporaneous
year income and wage bill. Finally, we use record transfer fees to capture
potential buyouts by rich owners. New owners often break the club’s transfer
fee record, while these purchases often have little effect on final performance.
Many record purchases often prove to be poor value for money, and the ef-
fect of transfer fees on performance are insignificant when controlling for the
budget.
Te instruments are constructed as follows. The relative lagged attendance
is measured as the one-year lag of a club’s attendance relative to the annual
average. Performance in cups is measured as the one-year club performance
in the Football Association Challenge Cup and the League Cup. The relative
transfer fee record variable is measured as the difference in a club’s transfer
fee record in a given season relative to the annual average.
The first-stage results reported in Table 9 (see appendix D) show that
these instruments have a significant effect on the relative log wage bill, except
38Data are constructed from newspaper articles and online sources.
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for the lagged cup performance in the post-Bosman era.
Table 4: Market-test: League Performance and Discrimination - IV and GMM
Dependent Variable: Relative League Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Estimator: Within-IV AB Within-IV AB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative log wage bill 0.335 0.576a 0.200c 0.472a
(0.25) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04)
Share of black English players employed 0.501b 1.364b -0.111 -0.116
(0.25) (0.54) (0.18) (0.48)
Number of players used -0.030a -0.036c -0.027a -0.010
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 259 262 247 257
Number of clubs 38 41 31 39
Number of instruments 3 28 3 30
AR1 p-value 0 0
AR2 p-value 0.70 0.37
Hansen p-value 0.72 0.47 0.15 0.48
Notes: the dependent variable Relative League Performance is equal to Rankingit−mintmaxt−mint . AB means Arellano-Bond.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by club, with a, b, and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% percent level, respectively.
The within-IV results are presented in columns (1) and (3) of Table (4).
These results confirm the post-Bosman change. Whereas the coefficient for
the share of black players employed is negative and significant before the
Bosman ruling, it is positive and insignificant post-Bosman.
These results could be affected by a weak instrument problem. If the
instruments correlates only weakly with the endogenous explanatory vari-
able, then statements of statistical significance may be misleading. However,
the first stage F-statistics on the excluded instruments are above the recom-
mended threshold of 10 (see Table 9 in appendix D). It is also reassuring
that the standard errors on the second-stage estimates are not much larger
than those in the within model of Table (3). Moreover, the instruments pass
standard validity assessments. The F-test of joint significance of the excluded
exogenous variables is rejected at the 1% level. The test of overidentifying re-
strictions for the excluded instruments is also passed and the Angrist-Pischke
first-stage chi-squared statistics reject the null of underidentification (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009).
In columns (2) and (4) of Table (4), we use the two-step generalized
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method of moments (GMM) approach of Arellano and Bond (1991). This
estimator differences away time-invariant club specific effects. It relies on the
dynamic structure of the model for identification by using lagged levels of
the independent variables as instruments for current differences. A problem
with GMM estimators is that their validity is subject to the use of a relatively
small or large number of instruments. A large number generates implausibly
low values of Hansen tests of instruments exogeneity (Roodman, 2009), while
using too few instruments is likely to generate a weak instruments problem
and to deliver inaccurate estimates. Following Roodman’s (2009) rule of
thumb, the number of instruments is strictly lower than the number of clubs
(groups) in the sample. This strikes a balance between estimate consistency
and test validity. The diagnostic tests (Hansen and first and second order
autocorrelation) presented at the bottom of the table reveal no evidence
against the validity of the instruments used by the GMM estimator.
The GMM estimates of the share of black English players employed pro-
duce the same result as the other estimators: the apparent discrimination
appears significant before the Bosman ruling but not after the ruling.
5.2 Discrimination Market-test on Match Performance
To test the robustness of our previous results, we employ a new methodol-
ogy to detect discrimination based on a different performance variable: the
discrimination market test on matches (see equation 14). For the sake of
simplification, we use our two preferred estimators for this purpose: ‘Within’
and ‘Within-IV’. This approach implies that for all estimations we control
for the pair of clubs involved in the match. We are thus exploiting the time
series variation in our panel by measuring the effect of differences in the
racial composition of the teams on the difference in results. The pre- and
post-Bosman results are reported in Table (5).
Even when controlling at the match level, we find the same evidence that
discrimination is present before Bosman and disappears after the ruling. The
estimates of the difference in the share of black players can be interpreted
as follows. Consider two teams with the same wage bill and zero black
34
players. The teams’ expected game result is a draw. However, before Bosman
(columns 1 and 2), a team that switched all its players for black players
could expect to win the next match by a single goal. A similar effect could
be achieved by doubling the wage budget. By contrast, the non-significant
coefficients of the difference in the share of black players, reported in columns
(3) and (4), suggests that wage discrimination has disappeared post-Bosman.
Table 5: Market-test: Match Performance and Discrimination - Within-IV and GMM
Dependent Variable: Match Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Estimator: Within Within-IV Within Within-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference in log wage bill 0.701a 1.469a 0.498a 0.340
(0.17) (0.42) (0.15) (0.28)
Difference in share of black players 0.854a 1.185a -0.145 0.070
(0.33) (0.43) (0.31) (0.40)
Difference in number of players used -0.048a -0.054a -0.029a -0.030a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 4494 3129 4402 3264
Hansen p-value 0.79 0.22
Pair of clubs fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: the dependent variable is the goal difference in the match. Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a, b, and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent level, respectively. Standard errors are two-way
clustered by receiving club and visiting club.
As before, we instrument the wage bill in order to account for possible
measurement errors and reverse causality. In columns (2) and (4), we instru-
mented the difference in wage bills with the differences in the instruments
used above (see subsection 5.1). The result of the first-stage estimates are
reported in Table (10) in Appendix D. The instruments pass the standard
validity assessments (see the bottom of Table 10). The F-test of joint sig-
nificance of the excluded exogenous variables is rejected at the 1% level and
above the recommended threshold of 10. The test of overidentifying restric-
tions for the excluded instruments is also passed and the Angrist-Pischke
first-stage chi-squared statistics reject the null of underidentification (An-
grist and Pischke, 2009). Moreover, it is again reassuring that the standard
errors on the second-stage estimates (col. 2 and 4) are not much larger than
those in the within model (col. 1 and 3, respectively).
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6 Robustness analysis
We run two robustness checks: (1) on the differences between English and
foreign black players (6.1) and (2) on the length of contracts (6.2).
6.1 Differences between English and foreign black play-
ers
We investigate the effect of the Bosman ruling on different categories of
foreign players. Although the Bosman ruling lifted quotas for EU players,
non-EU players are still subject to restrictive contracting conditions. For
instance, to obtain a UK work permit, non-EU players must fulfill a set of
stringent conditions.39 As a consequence, despite a general increase in labor
mobility, this increase should be relatively lower for non-EU players after the
Bosman ruling. We find evidence of this pattern by performing the market
test after Bosman on different shares of players: black English, EU black,
non-EU black, and non-EU white.40 Results are reported in Table (6). We
find that the coefficients for the share of non-EU black players are significant
and positive after Bosman, even if its statistical significance is lower when
we introduce club fixed effects (col. 3 and 4). Those coefficients imply that
wage discrimination did not disappear for the non-EU black players in the
English first league.
6.2 Length of contracts
Although the Bosman ruling greatly liberalized the soccer market, players
are not simply able to change clubs at will. If players remain under contract,
then they cannot move to a new club without a transfer fee being paid to
39The rule is that the player must have played at least 75% of his national team’s
competitive matches over the last two years and that his national team mus be in the
top 70 countries in the world. The appeals process allows for some flexibility in the rules,
but the non-EU nationals playing in the Premier League are still expected to be of high
quality.
40Non-EU players are non-member players in the common market or the EFTA zone.
We do not report results for the pre-Bosman period, as there were few non-English black
players playing in England (see section 4.2).
36
Table 6: Are non-EU players still discriminated? Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Dependent Variable: Relative League Performance
Estimator: OLS IV Within Within-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative wage bill 0.461a 0.475a 0.144b 0.111
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.13)
Share of black English players employed -0.060 -0.051 0.095 0.096
(0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20)
Share of EU black players employed 0.056 0.029 0.125 0.174
(0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.32)
Share of non-EU black players employed 0.550a 0.566a 0.587c 0.613c
(0.20) (0.20) (0.34) (0.34)
Share of non-EU white players employed 0.082 0.073 0.256 0.267
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Relative number of players used -0.026a -0.025a -0.026a -0.026a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 157 157 251 249
Club fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses, with a, b, and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by club. The first-stage for the Within-IV
(col. 4) is quite comparable with the one reported in Table (9) of Appendix (D) and available upon
request with the corresponding usual statistics.
his old club. This observation may still be relevant in the aftermath of the
Bosman ruling because some players may have signed contracts under the
pre-Bosman market environment, and may therefore still face discrimination
in the post-Bosman era until their contract comes to an end. Therefore,
we should still observe some discrimination at the beginning of the Bosman
period, with a decreasing trend in subsequent years as player contracts expire.
We test for this possibility by interacting the share of black English players
with a year trend in our regression. This interaction will capture whether
the regression coefficient for the share of black players is indeed decreasing
year by year as contracts expire in the immediate post-Bosman period.
We do not have data on contracts, but it appears that most contracts do
not last more than five years. We thus run specifications (13) and (14) with
the above interaction on a five-year period after the Bosman ruling: from
1996-1997 to 2000-2001. We use our two preferred estimators here: ‘Within’
and ‘Within-IV’. The first stages of the Within-IV are qualitatively identical
to those reported in Appendix (D) and are available upon request with the
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usual corresponding statistics. Results of this robustness check are reported
in Table 7.
Table 7: Do long contracts delay the impact of the Bosman Ruling? Post-Bosman
(1996-2000)
Dependent Variable:
Team Performance based on Rankings Goal Difference
Estimator: Within Within-IV Within Within-IV
Relative wage-bill 0.420a 0.352 0.980a -0.868
(0.07) (0.32) (0.08) (1.04)
Share of black English players employed 0.823c 0.926c 0.251 1.626
(0.43) (0.51) (0.64) (1.04)
Year-trend -0.290b -0.314b -0.204 -0.726b
(0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.28)
Observations 99 94 1768 1202
Notes: columns (3) and (4) use explanatory variables in differences as in Table 5. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, with a, b, and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent level,
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by club in columns (1) and (2) and are two-way clustered
by receiving club and visiting club in columns (3) and (4).
We find that there is indeed a negative and significant year trend in the
immediate aftermath of the Bosman ruling, which reinforces our idea that
the decrease in wage discrimination results from different contracting rules.
Given that our regression is for 5 years only and applies to a low number of
observations, the finding that these results are not very robust is expected.
The significance of the year trend for instance, disappears when we introduce
into the regression on rankings (col. 1 and 2) the number of players used,
but the point estimates remain similar.
7 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we find strong evidence that wage discrimination has become
insignificant following a decrease in labor market frictions. Given the em-
pirical results, we feel confident stating that the Bosman ruling decreased
and even eradicated the black-white wage gap for black English players in
the Premier League. As shown in our model, a decrease in labor market
frictions can erode the monopsony power of firms, potentially leading to a
decrease in apparent discrimination. Our model appears to fit the empirical
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facts quite well. A heartening interpretation of our results is that the proper
labor market conditions can cause wage differentials between white and black
employees to disappear even if racist attitudes remain.
A potential objection to our findings is that what we are measuring may
not truly be the effect of the Bosman ruling but may be a change in attitudes
toward racism and racial discrimination. However, as Lang and Lehmann
(2012) note, the wage gap between blacks and whites has been relatively
stable over the period of the shock. The data reject the idea of a dramatic
reduction in discrimination over our period of analysis for other professional
categories as well. Racial discrimination remains an important issue today,
as shown by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). These authors sent similar
CVs with different names, and the more “black-sounding” names were half as
likely as the others to receive a callback offer.
Moreover, racist incidents in soccer, whether from fellow soccer players,
owners, managers or supporters continue to make the headlines of English
newspapers: in 2011, the English captain John Terry was accused of racially
abusing Anton Ferdinand, and in 2012, Bolton Wanderers striker Marvin
Sordell was racially abused by a Millwall fan. In August 2014, it came to
light that the Cardiff City manager Malky Mackay shared racist e-mails and
texts with the director of soccer in charge of transfers, Iain Moody.41 In
November 2014, the owner of Wigan Athletic FC, Dave Whelan stated while
defending his decision to hire Malky Mackay that, “I think Jewish people
do chase money more than everybody else.” All these incidents suggest first
that racist attitudes are still present at all levels of English soccer, and,
second, that the decrease in discrimination is more likely to be attributed to
an increase in job-to-job mobility, in the wake of the Bosman ruling, rather
than to a dramatic change in attitudes of prejudiced employers in 1995.
41For instance, the Daily Mail report the following: “On August 16, 2012, a list of players
proposed by a French agent is forwarded, stating to Mackay that “he needs to rename his
agency the All Blacks.” A separate text in reference to a list of French players states the
following: “Not many white faces amongst that lot but worth considering.”
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A Proofs and derivations
A.1 A formula for wage discrimination
In this appendix we detail how we obtain the formula for wage discrimina-
tion (12). Let define the wage discrimination as the difference in expected
wages between individuals in groups A and B, such as:
D = EA(ω|t)− EB(ω|t) = buA + ktIA + tPA − buB − ktIB − tPB. (15)
We can simplify this expression since both types have the same likelihood
of being out of work. Thus, the expression for discrimination D is:
D = kt
(
λ0(1− γA)δ
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ0)
− λ0(1− γB)δ
(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
+t
(
λ1γAλ0(1− γA)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ0)
+
λ0γA
(λ0 + δ)
− λ1γBλ0(1− γB)
(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
− λ0γB
(λ0 + δ)
)
.
= kt
(
(δ + λ1γB)λ0(1− γA)δ − (δ + λ1γA)λ0(1− γB)δ
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
+t
(
(δ + λ1γB)λ1γAλ0(1− γA)− (δ + λ1γA)λ1γBλ0(1− γB)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
+
λ0(γA − γB)
(λ0 + δ)
)
= kt
(
λ0δ(γB − γA)(λ1 + δ)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
+t
(
λ1λ0((γB − γA)(λ1γBγA − δ) + δ(γ2B − γ2A))
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
+
λ0(γA − γB)
(λ0 + δ)
)
= kt
(
λ0δ(γB − γA)(−λ1 − δ)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
+t
(
λ0δ(γA − γB)(λ1 + δ + λ1γB + λ1γA) + λ0λ1δ(γ2B − γ2A)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
= tλ0δ(γA − γB)
(
(k ∗ (δ + λ1)) + (λ1 + δ + λ1γB + λ1γA)− λ1(γB + γA)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
,
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which amounts to the equation (12)
D = EA(ω|t)− EB(ω|t) = tλ0δ(γA − γB)
(
(1− k)(λ1 + δ)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
)
.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Proposition 1. The difference in expected wage is a parabola that
has a single maximum.
Proof. We look at the maximum and minimum of the equation D (12), de-
rived in appendix (A.1), by taking the derivative of this function with respect
to λ1:
∂D
∂λ1
= t
λ0δα
(1− α)λ1(δ + λ0)
(γA − γB)
(
(1− k)(λ1 + δ)
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)
)
+ t
λ0δ(1− k)
(δ + λ0)
(γA − γB)
×
 δ2 − ( α1−α )λ1δ(γA + γB)− λ21(α+11−α )γBγA − δ
(
δ( 1
1−α )(γA + γB) + λ1(
2α
1−α + 2)γBγA
)
[(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)]
2

= t
λ0δ
λ1(δ + λ0)(1− k)
(γA − γB)
(
( α
1−α )(λ1 + δ)(δ
2 + δλ1(γA + γB) + λ
2
1γAγB)
[(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)]
2
+
λ1
[
δ2 − ( α
1−α )λ1δ(γA + γB)− λ21(α+11−α )γBγA − δ
(
δ( 1
1−α )(γA + γB) + λ1(
2α
1−α + 2)γBγA
)]
((δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB))2

= t
λ0δ(1− k)
λ1(δ + λ0)
(γA − γB)
 δ2
(
(λ1 + δ)
α
1−α + λ1
)
− δ2λ1(γA + γB) + λ21γAγB(αδ−λ1−2δ1−α )
[(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ1γB)]
2
 . (16)
In order to study the sign of this expression, we only need to study the
sign of the second fraction of 16, since we consider cases where γA ≥ γB.
Consider the numerator of the second fraction:
δ2
(
(λ1 + δ)
α
1− α + λ1
)
− δ2λ1(γA + γB) + λ21γAγB
(
αδ − λ1 − 2δ
1− α
)
=
1
1− α
(
δ2 [λ1(1− (1− α)(γA + γB)) + δα] + λ21γAγB [(α− 2)δ − λ1]
)
.
We need to study the variation of the following equation in order to
understand the sign of the derivative of equation (12):
δ2λ1 (1− (1− α)(γA + γB)) + λ21γAγB [(α− 2)δ − λ1] + δ3α. (17)
Rewriting γA as
(
λ
α
1−α
1 yA
)
we get:
δ2λ1(1− (1− α)λ
α
1−α
1 (yA + yB)) + λ
2α
1−α+2
1 yAyB((α− 2)δ − λ1)) + δ3α.
43
Taking the derivative once more, we get
δ2 − δ2λ
α
1−α
1 (yA + yB))−
2
1− αλ
2α
1−α+1
1 yAyB(2− α)δ −
3− α
1− αλ
2α
1−α
1 yAyB.
This function is positive when λ1 is 0, and then monotonically decreases
as λ1 increases. We should therefore expect function 17 to increase and then
decrease. Notice, that when λ1 is 0, equation 17 is positive and equal to δ3α.
For higher values of λ1 (e.g. λ1 = 1), this value is then negative. We can then
establish that the function 17 is first positive, then negative at some value
of λ1. It follows that there will be a single value for which the derivative
is equal to 0, and that below this value, equation 16 will be positive, and
negative above it. Hence, the difference in expected wage will be a parabola
with a single maximum.
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
Proposition 2. The difference in expected wage is a parabola that
has a single maximum.
Proof. We need to find how the difference in moves evolves with λ1, i.e.,
study the sign of: DM = λ1γBIB − λ1γAIA
DM =
λ1γBλ0(1− γB)δ
(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)
− λ1γAλ(1− γA)δ
(δ + λ1γA)(δ + λ0)
=
λ1γBλ0(1− γB)δ(δ + λ1γA)− λ1γAλ0(1− γA)δ(δ + λ1γB)
(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)(δ + λ1γA)
=
λ1δλ0[γB(1− γB)(δ + λ1γA)− γA(1− γA)(δ + λ1γB)]
(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)(δ + λ1γA)
=
λ1δλ0[γBδ − γ2Bδ − λ1γAγ2B − γAδ + γ2Aδ + λ1γBγ2A]
(δ + λ1γB)(δ + λ0)(δ + λ1γA)
.
If we want to find the crossing point, either λ1 is 0, or [γBδ − γ2Bδ −
λ1γAγ
2
B−γAδ+γ2Aδ+λ1γBγ2A] is 0. This gives us the formula for the crossing
point:
λ∗1 =
δ[γB(γB − 1) + γA(1− γA)]
γBγA(γA − γB) .
Considering the case where 0 < γA < γB < 1, above λ∗1 group B individ-
uals change firms more often than individuals from group A and vice versa.
The crossing point is above 0 whenever γA
γB
>1−γB
1−γA .
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B Further evidence of discrimination
The age profile of black players before and after the Bosman ruling also
presents some evidence of discrimination. Figures (8) and (9) depict the
age density of black players in the squads of “discriminating” and “non-
discriminating” teams before and after the Bosman ruling respectively. We
consider discriminating firms as the teams whose proportions of black players
in the squad is lower than 75% of the other squads, and non-discriminating
firms as those where the proportions of black players is higher than 25%
of the other squads. Of course, these measures of discriminating and non-
discriminating firms are far from perfect, but they fit in with our empirical
strategy and our model. In our model, firms that discriminate are more likely
to have their players poached by rival firms. We should therefore expect these
firms to have less black players.
In Figure (8), we observe that the age densities of black players pre-
Bosman are quite similar in discriminating and non-discriminating clubs,
but there is a huge change post-Bosman (Figure 9): the age density of black
players is much more left-skewed in discriminating clubs. Why is this inter-
esting? If we consider that mobility was constrained before Bosman, then
we can propose the following explanation: when job-to-job mobility is high,
players that were employed in discriminating clubs want to leave as soon as
they get the chance. When players are young, they tend to play for their local
clubs or simply for any club that wants them, whether these discriminate or
not. Therefore, in discriminating clubs, the black players we find are mostly
young: older players leave as soon as they get the chance. However, as job-
to-job mobility was lower before Bosman, black players were less likely to
gain from this strategy, hence the similar age profiles between discriminating
and non-discriminating clubs.
Figure 8: Pre-Bosman Figure 9: Post-Bosman
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C Parameters for the simulations
Even though our labor market is very different to the one analyzed by Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002), we use the same values for the parameters common in
both papers. Our specification imposes an α between 0 and 1. Although the
expectation of c is not defined in this case, we do not use this expectation in
our analysis since firms directly observe the realization of c.
Table 8: Parameter values for the simulations
Parameters Values
k 0.5
λ0 0.04
δ 0.004
t 150
αW 0.8
αB 0.8
c˜W 0.05
c˜B 0.04
r 0.05
D First stage estimations
Table 9: Market-test: League Performance and Discrimination - 1st stage
Dependent Variable: Relative Log Wage Bill
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Share of black English players 0.009 -0.003
(0.140) (0.140)
Number of players used 0.007c -0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
Lagged log attendances 0.248a 0.522a
(0.008) (0.098)
Lagged cup performance 0.011b 0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
Relative record transfer fee 0.125a 0.023a
(0.036) (0.004)
Club fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 259 268
F test of excluded instruments 14.83a 28.69a
Angrist-Pischke underidentification χ2(3) 46.41a 83.99a
Test of overidentifying restrictions 6.50 3.85
χ2(2) p-value 0.72 0.15
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by club, with a, b and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
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Table 10: Market-test: Match Performance and Discrimination - 1st stage
Dependent Variable: Difference in Log Wage Bill
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Difference in share of black English players 0.035 0.116
(0.081) (0.123)
Difference in number of players used 0.009 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Difference in lagged attendances 0.010a 0.009a
(0.003) (0.003)
Difference in lagged cup performance 0.009a 0.004b
(0.003) (0.002)
Relative record transfer fee 0.088a 0.027a
(0.032) (0.045)
Pair of clubs fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 3129 3264
F test of excluded instruments 11.74a 17.09a
Angrist-Pischke underidentification χ2(3) 36.49a 53.46a
Test of overidentifying restrictions 0.46 3.03
χ2(2) p-value 0.79 0.22
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by pair of clubs, with a and b denoting significance at the 1%
and 5% level respectively.
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